According to local counsel’s exchanges with the DGCC, the notified transactions have not been prohibited by the Competition Authority since January 2021.
According to local counsel’s discussions with the DGCC, there are no proposals to change merger filing fees or monetary thresholds.
Yes. The submission of a merger notification is suspensive and mandatory in Gabon. In accordance with the provisions of Article 62 of the CEMAC Competition Regulation, all merger operations are subject to prior control and can only be carried out after the decision of the Competition Authority.
In addition, apart from the foreign direct investment review regime defined above, there is also a regime for the control of economic concentration/merger operations. In accordance with the provisions of Article 57 of the CEMAC Competition Regulation, notification formalities for merger control purposes are compulsory, regardless of the activity and location of the head office of the companies concerned, provided that they are likely to have a substantial impact on competition in the CEMAC market. Consequently, this review regime applies to foreign buyers.
In the context of the implementation of merger control, the notification is sent to the Community authority, including the CEMAC Commission, when the companies involved in the transaction have a combined turnover in the Common Market of more than CFAF 10 billion excluding tax (approx. USD 16,458,780), or when they together hold more than 30% of the market, or when the transaction involves at least two Member States in accordance with Articles 59 et seq. of the CEMAC Competition Regulation; and below the said thresholds, the notification is addressed to the national authority, which is the Ministry of the Economy/DGCC, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 33 et seq. of the Law Establishing the Competition Regime.
Moreover, Article 33 of the Law Establishing the Competition Regime specifies that any proposed economic concentration or any concentration likely to affect competition, in particular by creating or strengthening a dominant position, must be submitted to the Competition Authority for an opinion when the enterprises that are parties to the act, that are the subject of it or that are economically linked to them, have together carried out more than 25% of the sales, purchases or other transactions on a national market of substitutable products or services or on a substantial part of such a market.
Concerning the section on prosecution for failure to notify in advance, it should be noted that, according to local counsel’s exchanges with the DGCC, no entity has been investigated or sanctioned for skimming off the top and/or implementing a notifiable transaction in advance.
Consequently, no prosecution procedure has been initiated by the Competition Authority.
Not applicable. See the answer to the previous question.
Based on local counsel’s exchanges with the DGCC, there have been no cases at national or even Community level where the Competition Authority has fined an entity for non-compliance with the merger conditions.
Based on local counsel’s exchanges with the DGCC, there have not yet been any cases of prohibition of acquisition of shares or assets of another company by the competition authorities in Gabon.
Based on local counsel’s exchanges with the DGCC, there have not yet been any cases of notification of transactions in which the parties (acquirer and target) do not have a physical presence in Gabon.
The current regulation does not expressly provide for this situation. However, on the basis of the principles mentioned above, concerning the cases where notification is mandatory, we estimate that if the target and acquiring entities operate in the CEMAC zone, through subsidiaries located in at least two Member States, the transaction should be subject to mandatory notification. The same would apply if the transaction is considered likely to have a significant impact on the national or Community market.
Based on local counsel’s discussions with the DGCC, the Competition Authority has not approved any mergers subject to new or relevant conditions.
However, it should be noted that the Competition Authority can approve mergers under new or interesting conditions in accordance with the provisions of Article 37 paragraph 2 of the Law Establishing the Competition Regime. This Article specifies that the Minister in charge of the Economy may, on his own authority, or with the Minister of the economic sector concerned, after consulting the DGCC, enjoin the companies, by a reasoned decree with a deadline, to make the completion of the operation subject to the observance of requirements likely to contribute to economic and social progress to a sufficient extent to compensate for the harm to competition.
According to local counsel’s exchanges with the DGCC, there have been no cases where the Competition Authority has required notification of intra-group restructurings (which do not involve a change of ultimate control).
Note that under Article 32 of the Competition Act, local counsel understand that the notification requirement does not apply in the case of intra-group restructuring operations.
As indicated above, changes of control that may occur within the same group do not constitute economic concentrations within the meaning of the regulations in force.
In accordance with the regulations in force, local counsel understand that this restructuring must not result in the creation of a joint venture constituting an autonomous entity on a lasting basis, nor in the exercise of a decisive influence over one or more other undertakings (outside the group) or in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position and which appreciably affects competition in the CEMAC market, or in a part of it, as detailed below.
According to local counsel’s exchanges with the DGCC, no merger has yet been approved on public interest grounds in Gabon, not since January 2021, nor recently.
However, it should be noted that the Competition Authority can invoke public interest grounds to allow a transaction to take place that may undermine competition law.
In accordance with Article 68 of the CEMAC Competition Regulation, when it appears that a concentration substantially affects competition in the common market or a significant part of it, the CEMAC authority shall, before taking a decision, assess:
According to local counsel’s discussions with the DGCC, the Competition Authority has not yet prohibited a merger on the sole basis of public interest grounds.
In accordance with Article 62 of the CEMAC Competition Regulation and Article 33 of the Law on Competition, the economic concentration control regime applies in the following cases:
In view of the above, local counsel understand that mergers and joint ventures are subject to mandatory notification for merger control review under the applicable regulations when one of the criteria listed above is applicable.
However, according to local counsel’s exchanges with the DGCC, it appears that there have been no notifications of this type in Gabon.
In accordance with local counsel’s exchanges with the DGCC, and in the light of the legislation in force, an acquisition of minority shares without control may be considered as constituting a merger subject to a prior notification requirement, in particular:
when the undertakings which are parties to the transaction, which are the subject of the transaction or which are economically linked to them, have together achieved more than 25% of the sales, purchases or other transactions on a national market for substitutable products or services or on a substantial part of such a market; or
where the undertakings involved in the transaction have a combined turnover on the CEMAC market of more than CFAF 10 billion (excluding tax) (approx. USD 16,458,780), they have a combined market share of more than 30%.
Consequently, even in the case of the acquisition of minority shares, the operation must be notified in advance to the Competition Authority when one of the criteria listed above is met.
For non-complex transactions:
For complex transactions:
The national Competition Authority has six months from the date of notification to give its opinion (where the Minister in charge of the economy refers the case to the Competition Authority in the context of the examination of a notification); and
The CEMAC authority has seven months to render its decision (where the parties to a merger undertake to take measures to remedy, where appropriate, the anticompetitive effects of the merger).
It should be noted that, in practice, it is difficult to estimate the actual average duration of the procedures as, on the one hand, the law does not provide for an emergency procedure in this respect and, on the other hand, the Competition Authority generally examines notifications in the light of the legal deadlines given to it to give its decision.
The regulations in force do not provide for this procedure. The Competition Authority is obliged to decide within the legal time limits indicated above. Therefore, local counsel are of the opinion that neither the national nor the CEMAC authorities have the power to stop the clock for the examination of a merger.
The regulations in force do not expressly provide for this procedure. On the other hand, in accordance with Article 37 of the Law on the Competition Regime, the Minister in charge of the economy may, on his own authority, or with the Minister responsible for the economic sector concerned, after consulting the Competition Commission, enjoin undertakings, by means of a reasoned decree with a time limit, to:
Article 71 of the CEMAC Competition Regulation also provides that the parties to a merger may undertake to take measures to remedy the anticompetitive effects of the transaction, if any, either at the time of notification or at any time before the authority has taken a decision.
The various options presented above have the effect of increasing the time required to process the notification as presented above.
The regulations in force do not expressly provide for this procedure. According to local counsel’s discussions with the DGCC, the above observations also apply to mergers involving a sequential closing scheme.