Takeover Tactics
6. Takeover Tactics

[Last updated: 1 January 2025, unless otherwise noted]

6.1 Inside information

A company listed on a regulated market in Poland is required to immediately disclose to the public all "inside information" that relates to it, including all material changes in information that has already been disclosed to the public. Disclosure of inside information is regulated by the Market Abuse Regulation.

  • "Inside information" under the Market Abuse Regulation means information of a precise nature which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial instruments.
  • Information shall be deemed to be of a "precise nature" if it indicates a set of circumstances which exists or may reasonably be expected to come into existence, or an event which has occurred or may reasonably be expected to occur, where it is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that set of circumstances or event on the prices of financial instruments or related derivative financial instruments.
  • "Information which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of financial instruments or related derivative financial instruments" shall mean information that a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of their investment decision.

It is up to the company to determine if certain information qualifies as "inside information". This will often be a difficult exercise, and a large grey area will exist as to whether certain events will need to be disclosed or not. The PFSA actively monitors and, if necessary, sanctions breaches of disclosure obligations by Polish companies.

6.2 In the event of a public takeover bid

In the event of a (potential) mandatory takeover bid, the Polish takeover bid rules provide that no announcement can be made of a takeover bid without the prior notification of the PFSA. Following the notification, no approval of the authority is required and the bidder may proceed with completing the bid.

If a takeover bid is not announced (but required) or is carried out in breach of the applicable regulations, the bidder may not be able to exercise voting rights in the target and/or may be subject to a financial penalty of up to PLN 10,000,000 imposed by the PFSA.

6.3 Insider dealing and market abuse

The basic legal framework regarding insider dealing and market abuse under Polish law is included in the Market Abuse Regulation, and a number of additional EU directives and regulations. As the framework is based on EU legislation, similar rules on insider dealing and market abuse exist in other EEA jurisdictions.

In principle, the rules on insider dealing and market abuse remain applicable before, during and after a public takeover bid, albeit that during a takeover bid additional disclosures and restrictions apply in relation to trading in listed securities.

6.4 Common anti-takeover defense mechanisms

The table below provides an overview in summary form of the mechanisms that can be used by a target company to stage a defense against a takeover bid. These mechanisms take into account the restrictions that apply to the board and general shareholders' meeting of the target company pending a takeover bid.

Mechanism Assessment and considerations

1. Special voting rights

Holding shares giving special voting rights, e.g., two votes for each share.

  • Requires explicit authorization in the articles of association by a majority of 75% of the votes cast at a general shareholders' meeting.
  • Usually, special voting rights are approved before the IPO while the company is still closely held.
  • The maximum voting power is two votes per one share (although under previous regulations, the limit was five votes per one share and, as existing rights are protected, such companies can still be found on the market). However, a company that is already listed may not issue shares with preferential voting rights. 

2. Special rights to appoint board members

Special rights of key shareholder(s) to appoint certain (or even the majority of) board members, regardless of the number of shares held.

  • Requires explicit authorization in the articles of association by a majority of 75% of the votes cast at a general shareholders' meeting.
  • Usually special appointment rights are approved before the IPO while the company is still closely held.
  • Usually afforded to founders and/or heirs of founders.
  • Removal of special rights requires the consent of the holder.
  • May apply to appointment of supervisory board or management board members.
  • Management board members so appointed may always be removed by the general meeting by a majority of 50%. 

3. Limitation of voting rights

Clause in the articles of association providing for a maximum number of voting rights exercised by a single shareholder

  • A shareholder may only exercise its voting rights up to a specific level, e.g., 30% of the total voting rights.
  • The level cannot be lower than 10%. The most common level is 20%.
  • The limitation must apply to all shareholders equally.
  • Depending on the articles, the number of voting rights held may be calculated at the level of a single shareholder level or that of a group of affiliated shareholders.
  • Requires explicit inclusion in the articles of association by a majority of 75% of the votes cast at a general shareholders' meeting. 

4. Holding structures

Holding key assets through subsidiaries jointly controlled by certain shareholders or third parties.

  • Key assets, projects or revenue streams are held through subsidiaries with participation of certain shareholders or third parties.
  • Due to the special structure of shareholdings or special provisions in the subsidiary's articles of association, taking control of the parent company does not give automatic control over the subsidiary.
  • Usually do not require shareholders' approval if the holding structure is established at the time of acquisition of the key assets or at the commencement of a revenue generating project. 

5. Sale of crown jewels

An arrangement affecting the assets of, or creating a liability for, the company which is triggered by a change in control or the launch of a takeover bid.

  • Sale of the entire business (or an organized part of it) or the sale of real property (unless waived in the articles of association) requires prior approval by the general shareholders' meeting by 75% or 50% majority of the votes cast respectively.
  • Generally, no approval of the general meeting is required if the crown jewels are held through subsidiary companies. 

6. Capital increase (poison pill)

Capital increase by the board (authorized capital) without preferential rights of the shareholders.

  • Requires explicit authorization in the articles of association by a majority of 75% of the votes cast at a general shareholders' meeting at which at least one-third of the share capital is present or represented (no quorum is required at a second meeting that is convened if the one-third quorum was not reached at the first meeting).
  • The authorization is only valid for three years, but can be renewed.
  • The capital increase may not exceed 75% of the existing share capital or the amount remaining available under the authorized capital.
  • Shares may not be issued in exchange for in-kind contributions.
  • The issue price is determined by the management board with approval by the supervisory board.
  • Instead of the outright issuance of shares, warrants with preferential subscription rights can be issued, in which case payment of the issue price can be deferred.
  • Very rarely used as a takeover defense in Poland. 

7. Share buyback

Share buyback "with a view to avoiding an imminent and serious harm" to the company.

  • No authorization in the articles of association or from the general shareholders' meeting is required.
  • The total of directly and indirectly acquired shares may not exceed 20% of the share capital.
  • The amount that can be used to finance the share buyback is capped at the amount of available distributable profits and reserves.
  • Buybacks are to be made in compliance with corporate, transparency and market (abuse) rules.
  • The management board must provide the general shareholders' meeting with a report justifying the share buyback. 

8. Frustrating actions

Actions such as significant acquisitions, disposals, changes in indebtedness, extremely high golden parachutes, salary increases, etc.

  • No shareholders' approval is required unless the articles of association expressly require such approval for actions after the takeover bid has been notified. Such requirements are very rare.
  • May be questionable as actions against the best interests of the target and/or may lead to directors' liability

9. Shareholders’ agreements

Shareholders undertake to (consult with a view to) vote their shares in accordance with terms agreed among them.

  • No special restrictions as to purpose, time limit or scope of undertakings.
  • The shareholders could be considered as "acting in concert". If so, disclosure obligations apply and, if they hold together more than 50% of the voting rights, forming the group and any subsequent acquisition of shares will trigger an obligation to launch a takeover bid.
  • Assumes a stable shareholder base or reference shareholders.
  • Quite popular and usually confidential, unless "acting in concert" rules apply.

10. Veto rights for certain shareholders

Clauses providing for veto rights by key shareholders.

  • Generally considered illegal as regards voting at the general shareholders' meeting (although still found, and in fact enforced, in a number of companies).
  • Possible at the level of voting in the supervisory board or management board.
  • Requires explicit authorization in the articles of association by a majority of 75%.
  • Usually, veto rights are approved before the IPO while the company is still closely held.
  • Defined by reference to an individually identified shareholder. Not transferable. 

11. Limitations on share transfers

Board approval or pre-emptive restriction clauses in the articles of association or in agreements between shareholders.

  • In public companies, share transfer limitations are only possible if there are different classes of shares and certain classes are not listed. All listed shares must be freely transferable.
  • The articles of association may waive share transfer limitations on unlisted shares in the event of a takeover bid.
  • Contractual share transfer limitations, including limitations on listed shares, are possible and popular.
  • Share transfer limitations apply for a maximum of five years. Pre-emptive rights apply for a maximum of 10 years.
  • Shareholders could be considered as "acting in concert". If so, see "Shareholders' agreements" above.