[Last updated: 1 January 2025, unless otherwise noted]
4.1 Structure of acquisitions in Australia
A key strategic decision to make, for both the bidder and the target company in a control transaction, is which acquisition structure to use. It is possible to acquire the entire issued share capital of an Australian public company by two principal means: a takeover bid (the off-market version of which is like a "tender offer" in other jurisdictions) or a scheme of arrangement (which is like a "merger" in other jurisdictions).
4.2 Takeover bids
A takeover bid is essentially a regulated offer to buy target company shares which is made on identical terms to each target company shareholder.
There are two types of takeover bids in Australia: off-market bids and on-market bids. The key differences between these two methods are as follows:
Consideration |
Off-market bids |
On-market bids |
Bid procedure |
The offer is made by sending personalized, formal, written offers to every target company shareholder on identical terms. Shareholders accept by responding to the bidder. |
The bidder stands in the stock market (using a stockbroker) offering to buy all target shares at the offer price. Shareholders accept by selling on-market in the normal way, and settle sales on a standard T+2 basis. |
Types of target |
Listed or unlisted companies. Quoted or unquoted securities. |
Listed companies and quoted securities only. |
Offer price |
Cash, securities (shares, debentures, options, etc.) or any combination. |
Cash only (like any on-market trade) |
Conditions |
Can be conditional on a wide range of events, subject to some limitations. Common conditions include acceptances reaching a control or compulsory acquisition level, obtaining regulatory approvals and no "material adverse change". |
Must be unconditional. If a bidder requires foreign investment or competition regulatory approvals, an on-market bid may not be feasible. |
Partial bids |
Offer can be a full bid for 100% of each holder's shares, or a partial offer for up to a fixed proportion (such as 50%) of each holder's shares. |
Not possible – the offer must be for 100% of target shares. |
An off-market takeover bid is more commonly used than an on-market bid as it allows for flexibility in the offer structure, particularly due to the conditions that a bidder may impose.
Both types of takeover bid share a number of common characteristics, including the following:
The bid price must equal or exceed the highest price paid (or agreed to be paid) by the bidder or any of its associates during the four months before the date of the bid. If two or more alternatives are offered (for example, cash or scrip), then the value of each alternative must comply with the minimum price rule.
In the event that the bidder acquires shares in the target company on the market (as permitted by the Corporations Act) during the offer period and the consideration for shares purchased on the market is higher than under the takeover offer, the offer to all other target shareholders is increased and the additional amount is payable to those who have already accepted the offer.
Off-market takeover bids may be subject to conditions precedent. On-market bids, however, must be unconditional. Off-market bids are usually subject to a number of conditions, including a minimum acceptance condition (generally either 50.1% for control or 90% for compulsory acquisition), a condition that the target does not announce any material adverse change in its financial position during the bid period, and a condition that all necessary regulatory approvals are obtained. Bids can also be conditional on external events, such as a fall in a specified market index.
However, the Corporations Act provides that conditions of the following kind cannot be included:
The Corporations Act requires that a Bidder's Statement must be sent by the bidder to all target company shareholders with its offer. The document must include a range of specific information, as well as general disclosure of all information (including confidential information) known to the bidder that would be material to a decision regarding the acceptance of the offer.
The key specific disclosure requirements are:
The directors of the target company must issue a Target's Statement in response to the Bidder's Statement, which similarly has both specific and general disclosure obligations. The specific disclosure obligations include a recommendation from each target company director as to whether or not the bid should be accepted, together with reasons for that recommendation. The general disclosure obligation requires disclosure of all information known to directors of the target company which target shareholders and their professional advisers would reasonably require to make an informed decision in relation to the takeover bid. As with the Bidder's Statement, this includes material information which is otherwise confidential.
The directors' recommendations are important disclosures because it is common for some target shareholders to pay particular regard to the views of the board. The prospect of securing a favorable recommendation from target company directors (that is, a "friendly" bid) will often be attractive to a bidder. Accordingly, it is essential that the disclosure surrounding the directors' recommendations is fully explained and reasoned.
A Target's Statement must include an independent expert's report opining on whether the takeover bid is "fair and reasonable" in circumstances where the bidder's voting power in the target company is 30% or more, if the bidder is a director of the target company or if the bidder has a director in common with the target company. Even where an independent expert's report is not required by law, it is common for target companies to include such a report in the Target's Statement.
There is a general obligation on the bidder and target to update their respective Bidder's Statement or Target's Statement if, during the bid period, they become aware of a new matter that is material to target shareholders.
The update is made by preparing a supplementary statement, which is lodged with ASIC and sent to the ASX for public release.
4.3 Schemes of arrangement
An alternative acquisition structure to a takeover bid is a "scheme of arrangement" (sometimes called a merger). A scheme is a court-approved form of corporate reconstruction. The scheme structure involves a shareholder vote rather than offers being made to, and accepted by, each shareholder individually (as is the case in a takeover bid) and, depending on the outcome of the vote, it delivers an "all or nothing" result. If it is approved by shareholders and by the court, the scheme of arrangement binds all of the target company's shareholders, including those who voted against it (or did not vote at all). Conversely, if a scheme is not approved, then it does not become effective, even for those shareholders who voted in favor of the scheme.
The mechanics of a scheme usually involve a transfer of all existing target shares to the bidder in exchange for the offer price which, like a takeover, can involve cash, securities, or any combination of the two. Schemes can also provide for the cancellation of all target shares other than those held by the bidder. In either case, the target company becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of the bidder. The target company does not "merge into" the bidder and cease to exist, unlike the merger procedure in certain other jurisdictions.
As it is the target company which has to prepare the scheme documents, apply to the court and convene the shareholders' meeting, a scheme cannot be used for a hostile takeover.
A scheme of arrangement is a seven-step process:
Step |
1. Agree a transaction with a bidder: |
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2. Prepare a draft Scheme Booklet for shareholders:
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3. ASIC review and approval of Scheme Booklet:
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4. First court hearing:
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5. Shareholder meeting and vote:
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6. Second court hearing:
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7. ASIC lodgment and scheme implemented:
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There are several key documents required to implement a scheme of arrangement:
The key documents to be sent to shareholders for the shareholder meeting are contained in the Scheme Booklet and include the following:
4.4 Differences between a takeover bid and scheme of arrangement
Takeovers and schemes are quite different ways of reaching a similar outcome. Choosing the best structure for an acquisition depends on a number of factors, some of which are summarized below:
Takeover bid |
Scheme of arrangement |
|
Control of the process |
Bidder generally controls the process. Once commenced, the bidder can decide whether to waive conditions, extend the bid or increase the bid price. A takeover, unlike a scheme, can proceed with or without the target board's continued support or recommendation. |
Target company runs the scheme process, including preparing shareholder meeting documents, obtaining independent expert's report, regulatory filings, and making applications to the court. A target company can break off a scheme process leaving the bidder with a break fee as its only remedy. |
Going hostile |
Possible to make a hostile or unsolicited bid, forcing target to respond. |
Not possible, because the structure is driven by the target company. |
Approval threshold |
A bidder needs to achieve 90% shareholding to proceed to compulsory acquisition of the remaining shares. A higher test applies if the bidder's pre-bid holding exceeds 60%, in which case the bidder must also receive acceptances for at least 75% of the shares which it did not own at the start of the bid. However, a bidder can make the offer unconditional at any shareholding level it chooses below 90% if it does not require 100% control. |
Dual voting thresholds at shareholder meeting:
In each case, the test is based on only those shares which are actually voted. Shares that are not voted do not count as "no" votes. Where there are different classes, each class must separately vote and meet the thresholds. This can give holders in a small class of shares a veto power over the whole scheme. Court approval is also required. |
Effect of pre-bid shareholding on approvals |
Any existing shareholding counts towards the 90% compulsory acquisition threshold, making it easier to achieve. An existing holding exceeding 60% will increase the threshold (see above). |
The bidder and its associates cannot vote their own shares in favor of the scheme. An option over a third party's shares, however, will not always disqualify the third party from voting |
Certainty of outcome |
A bidder will usually have to declare its bid unconditional at an acceptance level below 90% to entice sophisticated shareholders to accept for their shares. An Institutional Acceptance Facility (IAF) can help overcome this impasse, but a bidder often has to accept the risk of falling short of 90% when it goes unconditional. This can make debt financing more difficult. A takeover structure can be to a bidder's advantage if it is content with majority control, as the bid need not be conditional on reaching compulsory acquisition thresholds. |
Schemes have an "all or nothing" outcome depending on whether the approval thresholds are met, and will generally complete on a date fixed in advance by the bidder and target company. A scheme is preferable from a debt financier's perspective for this reason. Unlike a takeover bid, a bidder under a scheme of arrangement cannot settle for partial success (such as majority control) because the shareholders' approval condition cannot be waived. |
Timetable and completion process |
As there is no court or shareholder approval process, a takeover bid can be launched quickly. A bidder can take early acceptances (if the bid is unconditional) to gain effective control of the target company in a matter of weeks. However, a takeover will often take a long time to reach compulsory acquisition thresholds, as this depends on how quickly the remaining shareholders send in their acceptances. The compulsory acquisition process itself then takes one to two months to complete. |
A scheme is initially a slower process than a takeover as it requires review and approval of scheme documents by both ASIC and the court before they can be sent to shareholders, and then a minimum 28 days' notice for the shareholders' meeting. Unlike a takeover, the end date of the scheme process can be fixed and, with an "all or nothing" result, all target shares are acquired by the bidder shortly after shareholder and court approval. |
Offer price |
The bidder can offer cash, shares, debentures or any combination of alternatives. However, all target shareholders must be offered the same choices. |
Separated and different offers are allowed. For example, equity in the bid vehicle may be offered only to target management, with cash offered to other shareholders. This will, however, create separate classes for voting purposes. |
Minimum bid price |
A takeover bid must offer at least the highest price paid for target company shares by the bidder (or its associates) in the four months before the bid. |
No minimum offer price rule applies. However, the court may take pre-scheme purchase prices into account when exercising its discretion to approve the scheme. |
Conditions precedent |
There are some restrictions on the types of conditions precedent that can be included in an offer. For example, conditions which depend on the bidder's opinion cannot be used. A bidder can waive any condition in its discretion (other than necessary regulatory approvals). |
There is no limit on types of conditions precedent, although all conditions must be either satisfied or waived by the time of the second court hearing. The bidder may not be able to waive conditions if they are expressed to be for the target's benefit. |
Amending the bid or offer price |
A takeover bid is very flexible. The bidder can:
in its discretion and at any time during the bid (although some restrictions apply in the final seven days of the bid period). This flexibility allows a bidder to respond quickly to a rival bidder. |
The terms of a scheme cannot be amended easily. Any variation after the shareholders' meeting has been convened will usually require court consent and may require the meeting to be reconvened, which will delay the timetable. The offer price can be increased with some prior notice but it requires cooperation from the target company. Payment terms cannot be accelerated for "early acceptances" before the shareholders' meeting as it is an "all or nothing" process. These features of a scheme make it more difficult for a bidder to respond to a rival bid. |